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Abstract: Reputation in a blockchain-based system is a digital representation of an entity’s standing 
or status in a specific domain. 
Issue 2 
 
This article belongs to the Glossary of decentralised technosocial systems, a special 
section of Internet Policy Review. 
Definition 
Reputation in a blockchain-based system is a digital representation of an entity’s 
standing or status in a specific domain. 
Origin and evolution of the term 
A. Origin 
Technologies such as the internet, or blockchain, enable large scale interactions 
among total strangers. Reputation systems (Resnick et al., 2000) appeared as a so-
lution to facilitate these interactions when some level of trust was required, such 
as in online shopping in peer to peer marketplaces like eBay, or online production 
communities (Benkler, 2006). Yet, these systems generally relied on a centralised 
operator, in charge of managing user reputation. 
There are several decentralised reputation systems (Hendrikx, 2015), most relying 
either on maintaining a personal list of trusted and untrusted nodes; aggregating 
such reputation information from other trusted nodes (with certain degree of tran-
sitivity such as in web-of-trust); or using Distributed Hash Tables to manage a 
global directory of semi-trusted nodes (Chawathe et al., 2003). 
Blockchain technology introduces the possibility for a next generation of reputa-
tion systems that utilise persistent global state and immutable transaction histo-
ries. This allows for transparency and security guarantees that were unavailable in 
previous distributed systems. Furthermore, the openness and persistence of 
blockchains makes them a valuable tool to support shared data stores that can be 
leveraged by multiple services, thereby enhancing reputation portability and inter-
operability. 
B. Evolution 
Bitcoin (Nakamoro, 2009) relied on blockchain technology to create a distributed 
payment system operating on top of a peer-to-peer network. The operations of Bit-
coin did not rely on trust or reputation. Instead, the influence of every network 
node is determined by the amount of resources engaged into the network: the 
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greater the amount of resources, the more influence one has in the network. Many 
of the other blockchain-based networks that followed suit relied on similar proto-
cols, also based on a resource-driven model (i.e. the amount of hashing power in 
the case of Proof-of-Work or the amount of tokens holding in the case of Proof-of-
Stake). 
Early reputation systems have been implemented at the infrastructure layer, as 
trust-based alternatives to the Proof-of-Work or Proof-of-Stake consensus algo-
rithm. For instance, delegated Proof-of-Stake (Larimer, 2014) allows for a more 
meritocratic system, based on merit or perceived trustworthiness. As a result, any-
one holding a particular amount of reputation within a blockchain community will 
have influence in proportion to the amount of reputation they hold. 
At the application layer, the introduction of "reputation" in the blockchain space 
was also an attempt to move away from the perception of blockchain technology 
as a purely trustless system, to enable the establishment of more sophisticated 
systems where some actors can be trusted. As argued by Hawlitschek and col-
leagues (Hawlitschek et al., 2018), the introduction of "reputation" is necessary for 
the establishment of trustless systems that operationally rely on trust. On the one 
hand, trustless systems such as Bitcoin are based on the assumption that no one 
can or shall be trusted. Hence, these systems are designed to entirely eliminate the 
need for trust, relying on cryptographic primitives and proofs in order to ensure 
that people behave according to the rules (Ali et al., 2016). On the other hand, 
there are many human-sensitive services (e.g., peer-to-peer marketplaces like 
Uber, Airbnb, or eBay) based on the assumption that some actors can be trusted to 
behave honestly. These systems rely on "reputation" in order to help users assess 
the trustworthiness of the other users interacting on these platforms. In order to 
provide these types of human-sensitive mediation services, blockchain-based ap-
plications need to also rely on some kind of reputation system. 
C. Coexisting uses/meanings 
Existing blockchain reputation systems vary widely in how reputation is earned 
and utilised. In many blockchain-based marketplaces, reputation does not have an 
explicit or software-defined role, but acts as a signal of trustworthiness. For in-
stance, in service marketplaces (Gitcoin, Bounties Network), users can decide who 
to hire or work for based on transaction histories and summary statistics. Similarly, 
in digital goods marketplaces (Rarible, OpenSea), a buyer can review the seller’s 
transaction history to evaluate the quality of goods for sale before making a pur-
chase. 
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In blockchain-based social media (Steemit, Hive, Sapien, Relevant) and work net-
works (Colony, Sourcecred), reputation represents a user’s evaluation weight on 
other users’ contributions. Reputation can be global in scope or limited to a specif-
ic community or domain. Evaluation-weighting alters reputation dynamically, as 
users continuously influence each other’s reputation scores in proportion to their 
own reputation. Some systems also incorporate time-based mechanisms to decay 
reputation with inactivity. 
In blockchain-based governance frameworks (Aragon, DAOstack, Moloch), reputa-
tion often determines a user’s voting weight on proposals in a given organisation. 
Reputation can also entitle the user to a proportional claim of the organisation’s 
assets or ongoing revenues. Reputation is often modified through community vot-
ing, where the votes of community members are weighted by their reputation (e.g. 
a community can vote whether to give 50 reputation points to Alice or remove 100 
reputation points from Bob). Just as in social media cases, reputation can also be 
modified by dynamic criteria stipulated by the community, such as reputation re-
wards for voting with the majority, creating proposals that pass, or reputation 
penalties for the reverse. 
Issues currently associated with the term 
A. Different types of reputation 
First of all, it is important to distinguish between two different types of reputation 
systems: “personal” and “global” reputation systems (Hendrikx, 2015). 
• Personal reputation systems are specific to an individual. They represent 
the standard mechanism of peer-to-peer reputation assignment. These 
systems are designed to assign a personal reputation score to each 
member of a particular network or community, although such a score will 
ultimately be relevant only to one specific individual. Hence, these systems 
necessarily rely on direct user input: users are expected to score each of 
their interactions with other community members, in order to help the 
system compute their corresponding reputation score. However, these 
systems often suffer from scalability issues. Indeed, the purpose of a 
reputation system is to provide information about the qualities of different 
users in a given domain, so that other users can make informed decisions 
about who they wish to interact with. Yet, a personal reputation system 
has limited capacity to do so, because it is not possible (or too costly) for a 
single user to evaluate the qualities of all the users in the system. In order 
to overcome this limitations, many of these reputation systems often 
implement a "web of trust" mechanism, leveraging the information 
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submitted by other people (who are regarded as trustworthy by the user) in 
order to compute the personal reputation score of those with whom such 
user did not yet have a sufficient amount of interaction. 
• Global reputation systems are not specific to any community member, but 
rather to the community as a whole. These systems assign a single and 
unique reputation score to the different actors in a particular community 
or network, which will be regarded by all community members as the sole 
and legitimate score. These reputation systems are rather easy to 
implement in a centralised platform; they are much more difficult to 
implement in a decentralised setting, since they require highly 
sophisticated mechanisms of reputation transfer that will not fall prey to 
Sybil attacks, where anyone can create multiple pseudonymous accounts 
to gain disproportionate influence over the system. 
It is important to note that both personal and global reputation systems suffer 
from specific limitations, although to different degrees. First of all, there is the 
problem of reputation being reduced to a single measure or score, which might 
not properly reflect the preferences of individual communities. Such a problem is 
particularly relevant in the context of global reputation systems, which are de-
signed to average reputation into a particular score, even if values are highly het-
erogeneous within the community of reference. Yet, it also subsists in the context 
of personal reputation systems that rely on a broader web-of-trust mechanism. 
Second, both global and personal reputation systems might suffer from an exces-
sive lack of granularity, to the extent that they do not differentiate between de-
fined characteristics or properties (e.g., reputation associated with a particular 
skillest, as opposed to a generic reputation score). Finally—and relatedly—reputa-
tion valuations can be based on objectively quantifiable facts, as much as subjec-
tive opinions. Mixing the two can lead to misleading aggregate reputation signals. 
B. Sybill attacks and identity 
Unlike popular online services, decentralised systems have no central party to veri-
fy user identities, ban fake accounts, or patrol spam. While beneficial for privacy, 
this opens the door to Sybil attacks. While decentralised sybil-proof reputation 
systems have long been regarded as a theoretical impossibility (Cheng & Fried-
man, 2005), blockchain-based reputation systems might overcome these chal-
lenges (Almasoud et al., 2020). 
One approach is to minimise the possibility of users leveraging multiple accounts 
by relying on centralised or decentralised identity systems—also known as “proof 
of personhood” (Siddarth et al., 2020). Decentralised identity systems often rely on 
web-of-trust models, where a small set of users slowly invites more users to be 
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peer-verified over time (Liu et al., 2020), or on credential-based models, where 
users can prove their uniqueness by collecting attestations about their identity 
from trusted third parties (Wang & De Filippi, 2020). 
Alternatively, reputation systems can be leveraged to avoid the need of identifying 
users. In that model, users need to accumulate a certain degree of reputation with-
in a particular blockchain-based system in order to influence the operation of that 
system (in proportion to the reputation they hold), and—potentially—assign repu-
tation to other users of the system (Almasoud et al., 2020). Because of the propor-
tionality between reputation and influence, an individual has to contribute just as 
much value, regardless of how many accounts they spread the effort over, so there 
is no added incentive for Sybil attacks (Pazaitis et al., 2017). 
C. Privacy 
In light of its attributes of transparency, censor-resistance, and immutability, 
blockchain technology can be instrumental to the operations of both personal and 
global reputation systems, enabling anyone to access and retrieve these scores, in 
order to compute both a personal and a global reputation score. 
However, in order to protect the privacy of users, the reputation system should 
avoid permanently registering in a blockchain the association between real-world 
identities and the identities of the reputation system. In addition, users should be 
aware of the risks of linking real-world identities to their blockchain accounts. 
Maintaining this separation makes it possible for users to protect their privacy 
while allowing for anyone interacting within their blockchain-based identity to 
evaluate the risks of each user in that domain. 
This is especially relevant in light of the new European General Data Protection 
Regulation, which provides users with the possibility to request the erasure of spe-
cific information deemed inaccurate, inappropriate, or obsolete. Given the im-
mutability of a blockchain, the recording of any type of data that can affect the 
reputation of a particular persona would potentially violate the provisions of the 
law, insofar as the persona can be linked back to a real-world identity. 
D. Oligarchies and power distribution 
The use of reputation systems also raises concerns about power concentration. The 
creation and consolidation of oligarchies are common in online communities. 
However, reputation systems might reinforce inequalities in such communities, as 
powerful actors are more likely to be trusted and increase their reputation while 
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those with low reputation will have fewer opportunities to increase their reputa-
tion. Blockchain systems use reputation as a source of economic or political power: 
these options are explicitly made available in many governance frameworks 
(Aragon, DaoStack, Moloch). Thus, the accumulation of reputation in such 
blockchain systems might result in even stronger power inequalities than in other 
online communities. 
E. Amplification of social inequalities 
It is worth considering the potential biases reputation systems incorporate and re-
produce. First, not all activities or contributions are a source of reputation in on-
line communities (Rozas & Gilbert, 2015). Some activities, such as contributing 
source code in free software projects are explicitly valued in these systems, while 
others such as community organising, or affective labour, typically carried by 
women (Iosub et al., 2014) are often invisible to these reputation systems. These 
types of biases can trigger new forms of inequalities incorporated directly into the 
algorithms managing a platform, such as higher work time and lower average 
wage for women in the so-called gig economy (Barzilay, 2016). We have briefly 
considered the reproduction of gender inequalities by reputation systems. Howev-
er, other dimensions of social injustice such as race or class, and their interactions, 
should also be considered when studying how reputation systems reproduce them. 
Conclusion 
Reputation in a blockchain-based system is a digital representation of an entity’s 
standing or status in a specific domain. Reputation is usually derived from aggre-
gated peer-evaluation of the entity’s past actions. It can be leveraged both explic-
itly through functions in the code (voting power, economic rights) or implicitly as a 
means of signalling an entity’s trustworthiness. 
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